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I. INTRODUCTION'
Imagine you are a financially savvy United States congressional
representative. In a week, you intend to announce the proposal of an
appropriations bill that will award a huge, no-bid contract to a publicly
traded energy company. You expect the news to sharply increase the price
of that company's stock. Enticed by this foolproof investment opportunity,
you decide to purchase shares of stock in the company that will be receiving
the contract-as does your legislative aide, who can also foresee the stock
price increase. A week after your stock purchase, you make your
announcement. The stock price rises, and the privileged few who knew your
announcement was coming make handsome capital gains. Those who sold
the shares to both you and your aide are deprived of a major windfall.
The apparent lack of fairness in this hypothetical is enough to make
most advocates of corporate and legislative transparency cringe. The
situation above presents some obvious analogues to corporate insider
trading. Yet, under current law, none of these described actions is illegal. So
would argue Representative Louise Slaughter, a Democrat from New York,
who initially proposed the aptly named STOCK (Stop Trading on
Congressional Knowledge) Act ("the Act"). According to Slaughter and her
cosponsors, Congressional trading on material nonpublic legislative
information is currently legal, but should be banned. Advocating for the
passage of the Act, Slaughter has asserted that, currently, "The potential for
abuse there is incredible."' Representative Brian Baird, a cosponsoring
Democrat from Washington, has waged a similarly public campaign for the
Act, asserting that "The American people expect Members and staffers to
work on their behalf and to represent their interests, not to increase the
returns on our investments and fatten our stock portfolios."3
The debate over the STOCK Act raises the question: Is regulation of
Congressional insider trading desirable? We intend to use the STOCK Act
as a springboard for approaching the need for Congressional insider trading
regulation from a slightly more academic perspective. First, we describe the
I. Matthew Barbarella, J.D. expected, Yale Law School, 2010; B.A. Yale
University, 2005; Daniel Cohen, J.D. expected, Yale Law School, 2011; B.A. Harvard
University, 2007; Alex Kardon, D. expected, Yale Law School, 2010; B.A. Columbia
University, 2007; Peter Molk, J.D. expected, Yale Law School, 2010; B.A. Amherst
College, 2006. We would like to thank John Morley for his expertise and guidance, and
Alan Schwartz, Jonathan Macey, and participants in the Yale Law School 2008 Capital
Markets and Financial Instruments Regulation Clinic for helpful comments.
2. Brody Mullins, Bill Seeks to Ban Insider Trading By Lawmakers and Their
Aides, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at Al.
3. Press Release, Congressman Brian Baird's Newsroom, Reps. Baird and
Slaughter Introduce Legislation To Prohibit Insider Trading on Capitol Hill (2007),
available at http://www.house.gov/appslist/press/wa03-baird/stockact.html.
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STOCK Act by placing it in recent historical context. Understanding the
motivation to reform Congressional ethics that existed earlier this decade is
crucial to evaluating the STOCK Act and its prospects for eventual passage
by Congress. Second, we review the body of insider trading law that already
operates to restrain corporate insiders and others from making some trades.
The most important SEC rules, as well as the most significant cases in
establishing insider trading doctrine-among them, Chiarella v. United
States,4 Dirks v. SEC,5 and United States v. 0'Hagan6-- are considered with
an eye toward their relevance to what we will generally refer to as
Congressional insider trading. To assess the practical need for regulation of
Congressional insider trading, we also discuss Congressional ethics rules
and the Speech or Debate Clause.7 The behavior of legislators and their
aides is affected by both formal rules and informal norms, and we endeavor
to explore both. The adequacy of current enforcement mechanisms for these
rules and standards is also considered.
Having addressed the factual and legal background of Congressional
insider trading, our analysis shifts to normative concerns. Some observers
have made persuasive academic arguments in favor of corporate insider
trading; others have countered with arguments for its prohibition. We
review these arguments and describe their applicability to Congressional
insider trading. Beyond the traditional points from the classical corporate
insider trading literature, we also consider original arguments that are
uniquely applicable to Congressional insider trading. Finally, we offer an
endorsement of regulating Congressional insider trading via legislation like
the STOCK Act-while making some practical suggestions for amending
the Act, as some provisions in the current proposal may not create the best
possible scheme of incentives. While regulating Congressional insider
trading may compromise the efficiency of capital markets to some degree,
this concern is ultimately outweighed by concerns about abuse and the
potential for perverse incentives among legislators and those who associate
with them.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
The STOCK Act was first proposed on March 28, 2006 as H.R. 5015.
It was sponsored by Baird, along with Slaughter and 13 other cosponsors.'
Despite Slaughter's visibility as Chairperson of the House Rules
Committee, the STOCK Act never advanced very far; indeed, it was quickly
4. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
5. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
6. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.
8. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 5015, 109th Cong. (2006).
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referred to the House Agriculture Committee, where it remained until the
end of the 109th Congress.' The Act was reintroduced to the 110th Congress
as H.R. 2341 on May 16, 2007, where it again did not advance past the
House Agriculture Committee. ° Most recently, the Act was introduced to
the 111 th Congress on January 26, 2009, as H.R. 682, where it has been
referred to the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. 1 The
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has not yet taken any action.1
2
It is possible that the STOCK Act has languished because of the primacy of
other priorities-among them, war, immigration reform, and the economic
crisis. However, another probable factor in the STOCK Act's lack of
success is that the impetus for the Act has unfortunately faded from public
consciousness in the last few years.
A. Trading Activities of Legislators and Their Aides
Indeed, when the STOCK Act was first proposed--or not long before
the STOCK Act was proposed, at least-Congressional ethics reform was in
much greater demand. A number of minor public controversies had inspired
calls for reform. The first such controversy involved the trading activities of
then-Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and those associated with his office.
In 1968, Frist's family founded the Hospital Corporation of America
("HCA"), a $25 billion international company. On July 8, 2005, with his
brother currently a director of HCA, 3 Senator Frist sold all of his stock,
reportedly to avoid conflict-of-interest questions if he ran for President.14
Less than a week later, HCA's stock price fell by roughly nine percent in
one day.'" The price continued to fall over the next few weeks, dropping a
total of about fifteen percent from the level at which Frist sold it.' 6 After
9. Id. (on March 28, 2006 H.R. 5015 was referred to several committees, the last
of which was the House Agric. Comm.). See GovTrack.us. H.R. 5015-109th Congress
(2006): Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, GovTrack.us (database of federal
legislation), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-5015 (last
visited April 15, 2009).
10. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 2341, 110th Congress
(2007). See GovTrack.us. H.R. 2341-110th Congress (2007): Stop Trading on Congressional
Knowledge Act, GovtTrack.us (database of federal legislation), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 110-2341 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
11. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 682, 111 th Cong. (2009).
12. Id., The STOCK Act's progress can be tracked using Govtrack, available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hi 11-682 (last visited April 15, 2009).
13. Carrie Johnson, Frist Not Charged as Investigators Close Probe of His Hospital
Stock Sales, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2007, at A13. Thomas Frist, Jr. had also previously
served as CEO and Chairman of the Board of HCA.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Jonathan M Katz, Senator Sold Stock Before Price Dropped; Shares Fell Two
Weeks Later, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2005, at A03.
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being investigated for eighteen months, Frist was exonerated by the U.S.
Attorney in the Southern District of New York and the SEC. 7 Still, the
initial appearance of impropriety brought public attention to legislators'
stock trades. Frist's name was at the center of another trading controversy
later in 2005, when he announced that the Senate would vote on a bill which
would make $140 billion of public funds available to pay off asbestos
liability claims."8 In the days prior to Frist's announcement, the stock prices
of several firms that could have been subject to asbestos liability claims
rose, prompting an informal SEC investigation into the possible
transmission of information from Frist's office to asset management firms. 9
Again, the investigations yielded no charges, but the appearance of possible
impropriety resulted in increased public attention for Congressional ethics.
Minor waves were also created by President Barack Obama's brush
with accusations of financial conflicts of interest as a senator. In 2005,
Obama invested $5,000 in a biotech company-and campaign donor-that
was trying to create a drug to combat avian flu.2" According to a New York
Times report, Obama "took the lead in a legislative push for more federal
spending to battle the disease" just two weeks later.2" As in the case of
Senator Frist, Obama's investment portfolio was reportedly a blind trust;
unlike Frist, however, Obama sold his stocks at a loss. Upon learning
about his biotech investment and another investment in a campaign donor's
company, Obama immediately traded both away, losing $13,000.23
Incidentally, Obama is not the only Democrat with presidential aspirations
whose investment history has created some speculation of wrongdoing;
Hillary Clinton's 1978 trades of cattle futures, on which she earned a
$99,541 profit on a $1,000 initial investment over a ten-month period, have
also been a focus of investigation (in addition to jealousy).,4
Finally, the most notable public outcry over Congressional insider
trading was prompted by the activities of Representative Tom DeLay and a
DeLay staffer named Tony Rudy. Indeed, Rudy's activities have been cited
by Slaughter and Baird as one of the primary motivations for the STOCK
17. Johnson, supra note 12, at A13.
18. Brody Mullins & Kara Scannell, Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists to Gather Tips in
Washington, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2006, at Al.
19. Id.
20. Mike Mclntire & Christopher Drew, Obama, in Brief Investing Foray In '05,
Took Same Path as Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at 1.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Caroline Baum & Victor Niederhoffer. Herd Instincts: Hillary's Investment
Profits - Ethics of Hillary Clinton's Cattle Futures Investments, NAT'L REv., Feb. 20, 1995,
at 1, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is-n3_v47/ai_16709018 (last
visited April 15, 2009)
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Act.25 Rudy is suspected of consistently trading based on material,
nonpublic legislative information in 1999 and 2000.26 Any profits Rudy
might have made on these transactions remain unknown, and may never
come to light. Still, his actions epitomize the type of behavior that the
STOCK Act seeks to proscribe. Rudy has never been charged in connection
with his securities trades, but he pled guilty to conspiracy charges in 2006
for his connection with the Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal. 27 The
subsequent attachment of his name to Congressional insider trading thus
helped raise the profile of the issue considerably.
Besides the anecdotal evidence of Congressional insider trading that
registered in the public consciousness, academic research has also indicated
the need for potential reform of legislators' trading practices. In 2004, Alan
Ziobrowski and colleagues published an article entitled Abnormal Returns
from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate. Using federally-
mandated annual financial disclosure reports, Ziobrowski et al.
reconstructed Senators' common stock portfolios and trades from 1993 to
1998.28 The average returns on these investments were staggering. A trade-
weighted portfolio combining Senators' stock purchases and sales beat the
market by 97 basis points per month, for an average annual return of 12.3
percent above the market.29 Lest this result be attributed to the skill of
financial advisors available to Senators and others in powerful, lucrative
positions, corporate insiders trading their companies' own stock received an
average return of just 6.4 to 8.5 percent above the market average.3
Ziobrowski also noted that abnormally high returns were especially
common among more junior Senators, 31 and were equally impressive
regardless of party affiliation.3 2
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Ziobrowski study is not the
Senators' apparent aptitude for picking stocks, but their seemingly
preternatural talent for knowing exactly when to buy and sell:
25. Brody Mullins, Bill Seeks to Ban Insider Trading By Lawmakers and Their
Aides, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at Al.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Alan J. Ziobrowski, Ping Cheng, James W. Boyd & Brigitte J. Ziobrowski,
Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate, 39 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 661, 662 (2004).
29. Id. at 673, 675. The average annual return r was calculated from the monthly
return m using the formula r = (l+m) 12
30. Leslie A. Jeng, Andrew Metrick & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Estimating the
Returns to Insider Trading: A Performance-Evaluation Perspective, 85(2) REV. OF ECON. &
STAT. 453, 455 (May 2003). Average annual returns r were calculated from the monthly
returns m using the formula r = (1+m)12
31. Ziobrowski et al., supra note 27, at 674.
32. Id. at 670.
[Vol. 9
Insider Trading in Congress
For the 12 months prior to acquisition, common stocks purchased by Senators ex-
hibit relatively small positive CARs [Cumulative Abnormal Returns] (3.4%). After
being acquired, the CARs increase to 28.6% during the next calendar year. The
CARs for the sample of sell transactions are equally interesting. The CARs after
sale by the Senators are nearly zero. However, prior to sale, we see another large
run-up in the CARs during the 12 months before the event-day (25.1%).33
In other words, the prices of common stocks bought by Senators tended to
stagnate prior to purchase, soar after purchase, and then stagnate again after
sale (see Figure 1, next page). 34 The prices for common stocks sold by
Senators tended to increase dramatically just before the sale, followed by no
further increases. These discoveries are likely the most robust evidence for
Congressional insider trading presented by the study. Indeed, it is after this
revelation that Ziobrowski et al. are emboldened to claim, "These results
clearly support the notion that members of the Senate trade with a
substantial informational advantage over ordinary investors."35
Perhaps attributing this informational advantage to legislators' and
federal employees' willingness to trade on nonpublic material information,
the STOCK Act's drafters focused the Act's second section on reforming
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("the SEA") and the Commodity
Exchange Act of 1936 ("the CEA"). Both the SEA and the CEA would be
augmented with provisions prohibiting transactions by those "in possession
of material nonpublic information, as defined by the Commission, relating
to any pending or prospective legislative action . . . . ,,3' The Act's third
section makes similar additions to the Rules of the House of Representatives
(also known as the "Code of Official Conduct").37 Were these provisions to
pass, one imagines that most of the informational advantages identified by
Ziobrowski et al. would disappear, leaving those involved in the legislative
process on more even footing with other investors.
33. Id. at 667.
34. Reproduced from Id. at 667.
35. Id. at 667.
36. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 682, 111th Cong. § 2
(2009).
37. Id. at §3.
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Daily Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Common Stocks Bought and Sold by U.S. Senators
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Figure 1.
III. CURRENT DETERRENTS TO INSIDER TRADING
Despite the evidence that Congressional insider trading may be
relatively common, parties have suggested that formal Congressional insider
trading restrictions are either unnecessary or unproductive." Some of these
arguments suggest that existing provisions in law or in informal norms
render such regulation essentially superfluous. Thus, reviewing the history
of insider trading law is necessary to determine whether Congressional
insider trading is currently illegal. This analysis also provides the
background against which arguments for and against Congressional insider
trading restrictions can be interpreted.
A. Insider Trading Law: Disclose or Abstain, Fiduciary Duty, 14e-3, Tippee
Liability, and Misappropriation
Insider trading restrictions have developed significantly since the early
1900s. Broadly, insider trading has been restricted in three ways.
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, insiders were subject to a
duty either to disclose relevant inside information before trading, or to
38. Daniel Gross, Insider Trading, Congressional-Style, SLATE, May 21, 2007,
available at http://www.slate.com/id/2166664/ (last visited April 15, 2009).
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abstain from trading. This disclosure requirement was modified in
Chiarella v. United States 9 and Dirks v. SEC0 to prohibit insider trading
only when the insider owed a fiduciary duty to his source of information. In
response to Chiarella, the Securities and Exchange Commission passed
Rule 14e-3 4' to prohibit insider trading in the tender offer context. Most
recently, in United States v. O'Hagan,4 2 the Supreme Court of the United
States has augmented the fiduciary duty theory with a "misappropriation
theory." According to this theory, insiders are liable if they have
misappropriated inside information. Each of these three periods will be
discussed in detail.
1. Disclose or Abstain and JOb-5
The United States Supreme Court set the tone for insider trading
regulation in Strong v. Repide.43 In that case, Repide, a director and
majority shareholder in the Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Company, purchased shares in the Company from Plaintiff Strong through
an agent to conceal his interest." Although the shares were close to
worthless, the Philippine Government had made an offer to purchase a large
area of land, including that owned by the Philippine Sugar Estates.45 Repide,
representing the Company in these negotiations, had refused the
government's offer, but the impending transaction would greatly increase
the value of the shares when it finally went through.46 Strong did not know
about the government's interest, and her agent sold her shares to Repide's
agent shortly before the transaction with the government was finalized and
the value of the shares increased dramatically.47
In determining that Repide owed a duty to disclose his knowledge
about the potential value of the shares before purchasing from shareholders,
the Court asserted that "there are cases where, by reason of the special facts,
such duty exists."48 The Court declined to outline what such special facts
might generally be, but concluded that Repide's position as director,
majority shareholder, and negotiator with the government regarding the
purchase created a special relationship between him and shareholders that
39. 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
40. 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983).
41. 17 C.F.R § 240.14e-3 (2008).
42. 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997).
43. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
44. Id. at 425.
45. Id. at 422, 426.
46. Id. at 424.
47. Id. at 422.
48. Id. at 431.
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does not ordinarily exist and resulted in a fraudulent transaction.49 Because
of this relationship, he was required either to disclose his inside knowledge,
or to refrain from trading.
This case developed a prototype for the "disclose or abstain" rule,
although its application to situations with special facts offered shareholder
protection only in limited cases. In particular, a duty could arise only in
situations when a director personally sought a stockholder." Such a duty
usually did not apply, in transactions occurring at a stock exchange where
the identities of the buyer and seller were not known to each other, as there
was no special relationship that would create such a duty between the
insider and the other party.5' In general, most states recognized a director's
duty only to his corporation and the maximization of its profits, and not
towards the shareholders. 2 They declined to extend the trustee relationship
to the situation of a director dealing with a shareholder. 3 However, the
sphere of the disclose or abstain rule's influence would become
significantly enlarged over the next decades with the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and resulting rules and litigation.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("the SEA") was passed "to
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets... ' The SEA regulates
the buying and selling of secondary securities, which is how most securities
are traded, as opposed to primary securities issues which are covered by the
Securities Act of 1933. Although the only section of the SEA to deal
explicitly with regulating insider trading is Section 16," the SEA also
created the Securities and Exchange Commission ("the SEC") 6 and gave it
the power to promulgate various rules and regulations,57 perhaps the most
important of which is Rule I Ob-5 ("the Rule").
The SEC adopted the Rule in 1948. The Rule states that
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
49. Id. at 431-32.
50. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 363 (1933).
51. Id. at 362-63.
52. Michael Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase
Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53, 55 (1960).
53. Id. at 56.
54. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 882 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78 (2008)).
55. Id. at 896. Section 16 requires both disclosure of insiders' transactions in their
own securities as well as disgorging profits on short-term (six month) purchases and sales in
company stock to the company.
56. Id. at 885.
57. Id. at 891.
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(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 58
On its surface, it is unclear how the Rule restricts prototypical insider
trading. In fact, insider trading is not explicitly mentioned in the Rule at all,
making one wonder how it can be proscribed by the Rule. Additionally, the
Rule does not define what a "material fact" is or what insider behavior
would constitute operation of a fraud, which appears essential to having
insider trading fall under the Rule's purview. The landmark insider trading
case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur 9 provided clarifications for many of these
ambiguities.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur is one of the pivotal insider trading
regulation cases, and it defined the disclose or abstain rule that became the
dominant rule at the time.6 This period represents the high point of insider
trading restrictions.6' The case was an action by the SEC to enjoin
defendants, various officers and employees of Texas Gulf Sulfur ("TGS"),
from engaging in future insider trading violations and to force rescission of
their alleged insider trades.62 While exploring in Canada, TGS found a drill
site that "was unusually good and ... it excited the interest and speculation
of those who knew about it."63 In an effort to prevent the information from
spreading and to enable TGS to buy surrounding land cheaply, the company
president instructed the workers and officers who knew about the find to
keep the information confidential. Although they did not directly leak
information, the employees and officers began buying stock and options in
the company before the news of the drill site was publicly released, with the
result that the stock price increased from $18 per share in November 1963,
the time of the discovery, to approximately $30 per share in April 1964, just
prior to TGS's public announcement of the valuable site.' The stock closed
at $36 3/8 per share at the end of the day in which the find was announced.65
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2008).
59. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
60. This rule was put forth by the SEC in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,
911 (1961), but was not adopted by the federal appeals courts until this case.
61. The sweeping restriction on insider trading in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur has been
dubbed "[tihe utopian dream of information parity among investors." James D. Cox, Insider
Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School," 1986 DUKE L.J.
628, 631.
62. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d at 839-42.
63. Id. at 843-44.
64. Id. at 847.
65. Id. at 847. Defendants' transactions are documented at 842.
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The Second Circuit held select defendants of TGS liable for insider
trading under Rule 1Ob-5. Quoting the SEC's Cady, Roberts66 decision, the
Court determined that
The essence of the Rule [I Ob-5] is that anyone who, trading for his own account in
the securities of a corporation has 'access, directly or indirectly, to information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit
of anyone' may not take 'advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing,' i.e., the investing public.
67
The Court then proceeded to state the disclose or abstain rule that became
the dominant insider trading restriction:
Thus, anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to
the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a
corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or
recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains un-
disclosed.68
Material information was held to include any information that a reasonable
man would think was important in determining a security's price.69
Therefore, because the information of the valuable ore lode was material,
defendants had a duty either to disclose this information before trading or to
abstain from trading. Their promise of confidentiality towards TGS's
president meant their only course of action, that did not involve a breach of
duty, was to abstain from trading.
Arguably, the Texas Gulf Sulfur rule is too broad and restricts
behavior, particularly by financial analysts, that is socially useful and
desirable.7" Investment houses would have little incentive to search for
company information if they were forced to disclose it publicly, rather than
allowed to use it to make a profit. This searching for information, and
subsequent trading, yields more efficient securities markets whose prices
more accurately reflect the underlying assets' values. Well-priced securities
ensure that capital flows to the most productive projects, and allow
66. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
67. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d at 848.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 849. The U.S. Supreme Court determined in Basic Inc. v. Levinson that
for information to be material "there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of
the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available." 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449). The Court makes clear that it
does not want to set too low a threshold on material information for fear of "bury[ing] the
shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information - a result that is hardly conducive to
informed decisionmaking." 485 U.S. at 231 (1988) (quoting TSC v. Northway, 426 U.S. at
448-49).
70. See, e.g., Matthew Farley, A Current Look at the Law of Insider Trading, 39
Bus. LAW. 1771, 1774 (1984).
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managers to better gauge when potential investments will have positive net
present values, since their calculations often use prices of other companies
as an input.71 Furthermore, analysts might be prohibited from using even
material, public information to form security price opinions because their
manipulations of that information are not public, but might be deemed
material. Nevertheless, this restrictive rule persisted until the Supreme
Court's decision in Chiarella72 when it required a fiduciary duty to exist
between the insider and his trading partner for liability.
2. Fiduciary Duty
Chiarella worked for Pandrick Press, a financial printer that printed
materials including corporate takeover bids. When Pandrick Press was
contracted to print merger documents, it would receive the documents with
missing or false names, which were not filled in until the night before final
printing. This practice was intended not only to give Pandrick Press time to
set up its printers, but more importantly to prevent employees from learning
the identity of the companies engaged in the mergers, thereby keeping the
information secret as long as possible. Despite this safeguard, Chiarella
learned the names of parties involved in five separate merger documents he
handled. Rather than disclosing the information, Chiarella purchased stock
in the target companies and was consequently charged by the SEC for
violating Rule lOb-5.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Chiarella's conviction
under the equal access disclose or abstain rule announced in Texas Gulf
Sulfur, holding that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly
receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to
trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose. '73
Chiarella thus breached this duty towards his trading partners by failing to
disclose his material, nonpublic information.
In reversing the Court of Appeals on Chiarella's convictions, the
Supreme Court narrowed the reach of the disclose or abstain rule by
determining that a duty to disclose "does not arise from the mere possession
of nonpublic market information."74 Instead, an insider might have a duty to
his trading partner if he acts as his agent, fiduciary, or person in whom the
71. For instance, a popular method (the Capital Asset Pricing Model) for calculating
the required rate of return for a security requires determining how the security's price moves
relative to the market, which incorporates stock prices of all companies. An accurate
required rate of return, therefore, depends not only on an accurately-priced security but also
an accurately-priced market.
72. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
73. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2nd Cir.1978) (emphasis
added).
74. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
Spring]
Journal of Business & Securities Law
trading partner has placed trust and confidence." Because Chiarella had no
relationship with his trading partners with whom he traded over an
impersonal public exchange, he had no duty to disclose his inside
information to them. 6 The court did not reach the question of whether
Chiarella might have owed a duty to the tender offeror who contracted with
Pandrick Press as it was not raised before the original jury. However, a
version of such a duty was advocated in Chief Justice Burger's dissent77 and
would eventually be adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v.
O 'Hagan.V8
3. Rule 14e-3
In response to the Court's holding in Chiarella, the SEC adopted Rule
14e-3 in 1980 to prevent the type of behavior in which Chiarella engaged.7 9
Rule 14e-3 prohibits insider trading on tender offer information in two
ways. First, if a tender offer is underway, or if significant steps towards a
tender offer have been taken, a trader with related material information is
prohibited from trading if he knows or has reason to know that such
information came from either the tender offeror, a company involved in the
tender offer, or anyone acting on behalf of the offeror."0 Notice that this
restriction does not depend upon any fiduciary duty between the potential
trader and his trading partner or one of the tender offer parties. Second,
Rule 14e-3 makes it unlawful for people involved in a tender offer to
communicate inside information if it is reasonably foreseeable that the
information will be used for insider trading.' Had this rule been in place
prior to Chiarella's prosecution, his behavior would have been in violation
of the first insider trading prohibition. However, general insider trading
behavior is not subject to this rule, as it applies only in the tender offer
context.
4. Tippee Liability
Dirks was the next important case that shaped current insider trading
liability. 2 While working as an insurance sector analyst, Dirks was
75. Id. at 232.
76. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (The Supreme Court
requires intent to manipulate, deceive, or defraud rather than simple negligence for a private
action under Rule lOb-5).
77. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, J., dissenting).
78. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
79. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2008).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a).
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240 14e-3(d).
82. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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approached by a former Equity Funding of America employee, alleging that
due to fraudulent activities, the company's assets were largely inflated.
During his investigation of the claims, Dirks freely discussed the allegations
with some of his institutional clients, who then subsequently sold their
Equity Funding holdings. As a result of these sales, Equity Funding share
prices plummeted, trading was halted, and investigations by the Wall Street
Journal and the SEC were undertaken. Throughout this period, neither
Dirks nor his company traded in Equity Funding stock.
Dirks raised issues of when an outsider could be held liable for insider
trading violations. Dirks did not work for Equity Funding and had no
relationship with them, meaning he was not an insider in the traditional
sense. Rather, he was considered a "tippee"-someone who gained
information from an insider, or the "tipper." Traditional insiders have
independent fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders that can
be used to hold them liable for insider trading; Dirks, as a tippee with no
connection to Equity Funding or its shareholders, clearly did not have the
requisite relationship needed to establish liability after Chiarella.83 The
Supreme Court took this opportunity to define when a tippee acquires a duty
to disclose or abstain.
While reaffirming its requirement from Chiarella, the Supreme Court
determined that a tippee (Dirks in this case) gains an obligation to disclose
or abstain when the tipper (Dirks's source) violates his insider's fiduciary
duty." Such a breach occurs when "the insider personally will benefit,
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure .... And absent a breach by the
insider, there is no derivative breach."86 Because Dirks's source did not
derive direct or indirect gain from passing his information along, the source
did not breach his fiduciary duty, and therefore Dirks had no derivative duty
to abstain from using the inside information."7
Dirks also attempted to carve out a safe haven for stock analysts. As
the majority notes, "[i]mposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because
a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider
and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market
analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of
a healthy market."88 As long as an analyst's source does not gain directly or
indirectly from passing information to the analyst, neither the analyst nor
his source will be liable for any trades that result. Thus, analysts can
continue their information-gathering activities that might be stopped if the
83. Id. at 654-55.
84. Id. at 657-58.
85. Id. at 661-62.
86. Id. at 662.
87. Id. at 667.
88. Id. at 658.
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Court recognized a general duty either to disclose all nonpublic material
information or to abstain from trading.
Following the Supreme Court decisions in Chiarella and Dirks, the
misappropriation theory outlined by Burger in his Chiarella dissent was a
controversial theory of insider trading liability. Some courts accepted the
theory,"' while others rejected it." Finally, in 1995, the Supreme Court
officially adopted the theory in United States v. O'Hagan.9'
5. Misappropriation Theory
James O'Hagan was a partner in a law firm that had been hired to
represent Grand Metropolitan PLC regarding a potential tender offer for
Pillsbury. Although O'Hagan did not work on the case, he found out about
the impending tender offer and proceeded to buy stock and call options in
Pillsbury, ultimately making more than $4.3 million in profit once the
tender offer was announced. 92 He was convicted in Federal District Court
for violating Rule 14e-3's restriction against trading on inside information
related to a tender offer. He was also held to have violated Rule lOb-5 for
having breached a fiduciary duty by "misappropriating" inside
information. 3 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed all
O'Hagan's convictions, holding that misappropriation was not a valid
theory for finding liability, and that Rule 14e-3 exceeded the SEC's
rulemaking authority by not requiring a showing' of fiduciary duty for
liability. 94 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on both
counts, in the process upholding Rule 14e-3 and adopting the
misappropriation theory.
The misappropriation theory posits that a trader commits fraud under
Rule 1Ob-5 in connection with a securities transaction when he breaches a
duty of loyalty or confidentiality by misappropriating confidential
information. 5 In this case, O'Hagan breached a duty towards his law firm
and Grand Metropolitan, the tender offeror, when he traded on the
confidential tender offer information. Note, however, that if the trader
discloses his impending trading plans to his informational source, he is no
longer liable for insider trading under Rule lOb-5 because he no longer is
89. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 863 (1983).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
91. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). The Supreme Court had previously split evenly on
whether to adopt the misappropriation theory. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19,
24(1987).
92. 521 U.S. at 647-48.
93. SEC v. O'Hagan, 901 F. Supp. 1461 (1995).
94. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 622, 627 (8th Cir. 1996).
95. 521 U.S. at 652.
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employing a "deceptive device," although he could still be liable under state
law for breaching a duty of loyalty.96 If Chiarella were analyzed under this
theory, Chiarella likely could have been held liable for misappropriating
confidential information relating to the tender offers from his employer as
well as the parties to the tender offer.
6. Summary of Current Insider Trading Restrictions
In summary, under current insider trading law, liability can arise in
three distinct ways. First, an insider is required to disclose his information
prior to trading, or to abstain from trading, if he owes a fiduciary duty
towards his trading partner. This restriction was held in Texas Gulf Sulfur
and modified by Chiarella. A tippee can be held liable in the same way if
his tipper has such a duty, as determined in Dirks. Second, Rule 14e-3
prohibits traders from buying or selling securities using inside information
related to a tender offer, if the securities' companies have entered, or taken
substantial steps towards, a tender offer. Finally, O'Hagan affirmed Rule
lOb-5 liability when a trader misappropriates inside information without
informing the information's source.
B. The Applicability of Insider Trading Doctrine
If there is a commonality between the disclose or abstain rule and the
misappropriation rule,97 it is the requirement that some specific duty be
violated. That duty can be a fiduciary one owed to a trading partner under
the disclose or abstain theory, or one of loyalty or confidentiality under the
misappropriation theory. In the case of Congressional insider trading,
however, it is not clear that congressmen or their aides owe any party such a
duty in more than a vague sense. Andrew George argues that congressmen
already have a duty preventing them from trading on inside information,98
The duty may be derived from three sources: common law relationships,
agreements to maintain information in confidence, and a history of sharing
confidences.99  A violation of this duty through trading on inside
information may leave a congressional representative open to prosecution
under the misappropriation theory. However, even George acknowledges
the need for confirmation of regulators' power to prosecute under this
96. Id. at 655.
97. Rule 14e-3 is not particularly applicable to Congressional insider trading, as one
imagines that legislators rarely come into possession of inside information related to a tender
offer.
98. Andrew George, Essay, Public (Self)-Service: Illegal Trading on Confidential
Congressional Information, 2 HARv. L. & POL'Y. REV. 161, 163 (2008).
99. Id. at 164.
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theory. l"' It is this ambiguity of duty and ability to prosecute that further
regulation would ameliorate definitively by augmenting the Securities
Exchange Act and the Commodity Futures Trading Act.
George is not the first to argue that congressional representatives
possess a duty that might keep them from trading on inside information.
Other observers believe that the basis for a fiduciary duty of congressional
representatives to their constituents or to the country at large should already
be recognized, even without new legislation. Over thirty years ago, potential
reformers such as Joseph Kalo were already observing that "[t]he
application of fiduciary duties to activities of government employees is not
novel.""'' Besides pointing to some dicta that suggested a public office
should be regarded as a trust,0 2 Kalo suggested that "deeply engrained in
the American people is a belief that public office, and confidential
information acquired as a result of holding such office, should not be used
for private gain." ' 3 Years later, other observers picked up on similar
threads. For instance, The Fiduciary Duty of Former Government
Employees, a Yale Law Journal note, argues that a "general fiduciary duty"
is necessary for former congressional representatives and other federal
employees."° According to this argument, public office involves a
relationship of trust, and as a trustee of the electorate, a public officer
should have duties akin to those of trustees in the private sector.0 5 Like
Kalo's argument, this assertion seems to rely on the implicit expectations
that Americans may have for their elected leaders. Americans are supposed
to believe that those who hold public office have promised to subordinate
their own private gain for the public good.
While Kalo's perception may be true, it hardly offers a solid legal
basis for liability based on the disclose or abstain rule or the
misappropriation theory. Both Slaughter and the Wall Street Journal have
quoted Thomas Newkirk, a former SEC official and current partner at
Jenner and Block:
If a congressman learns that his committee is about to do something that would af-
fect a company, he can go trade on that because he is not obligated to keep that in-
formation confidential.... He is not breaching a duty of confidentiality to anybody
and therefore he would not be liable for insider trading.
116
100. Id. at 172.
101. Joseph Kalo, Deterring Misuse of Confidential Government Information: A
Proposed Citizens'Action, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1577, 1581 (1974).
102. Id. at 1581-82.
103. Id. at 1582.
104. Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Former Government Employees, 90 Yale L.J. 189
(1980).
105. Id. at 200.
106. Mullins, supra note 1, at Al.
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One imagines that this lack of a concrete duty, rather than the vague sense
that congressional representatives ought to place public interests first, might
control if a congressional representative were sued for trading on material
nonpublic legislative information under the current legal regime. If
congressional representatives and others are to be barred from engaging in
such activities, regulation appears necessary insofar as it overcomes
legislators' lack of a well-defined duty.
C. Other Relevant Laws and Norms
1. The Speech or Debate Clause
One possible concern about regulation of congressional
representatives' trading is its potential conflict with the Speech or Debate
Clause of the United States Constitution. The Clause, which protects
members of Congress from prosecution for legislative activities, has been a
prominent consideration in other attempted ethics reforms. °7 For example,
a report on the creation of an independent ethics commission in place of the
current member-composed committees by the New York City Bar
Association noted that opposition to the independent committees was
frequently rooted in potential conflicts with the Speech or Debate Clause. °8
This section provides a brief overview of the type of activities covered by
the Speech or Debate Clause, but concludes that regulation of Congressional
insider trading would probably not conflict with the Clause.
The Speech or Debate Clause, in Article I of the Constitution,
provides immunity to legislators for certain activities. The Clause reads:
"The Senators and Representatives ..... shall in all Cases, except Treason,
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their
Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses ... for any Speech or
Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place."'0 9
The text of the provision was adapted from the English Bill of Rights of
1689, and was influenced by the "long struggle for parliamentary
supremacy" in England.10 Today, the Supreme Court views the Clause as
an element of the balance of powers, and has said that "[t]he legislative
privilege, protecting against possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive
107. The Committee on Government Ethics, The Creation of an Independent Ethics
Commission 63-1 REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 128, 141 (2008).
108. Id.
109. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 6, cI.1.
110. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
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and conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one manifestation of the 'practical
security' for ensuring the independence of the legislature.""'
The Speech or Debate Clause accordingly grants immunity to
representatives for activities that promote legislative independence, but does
not protect activity that does not have a legislative purpose. The Supreme
Court has held that the Clause covers activity "generally done in a session
of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it.""' 2
However, "the Clause has not been extended beyond the legislative
sphere."'13 Based on this understanding of the Clause, it does not protect
activity "that is in no wise related to the due functioning of the legislative
process."' " However, beyond this general principle, the Clause also does
not protect "all things in any way related to the legislative
process.... [because of the concern] that there are few activities in which a
legislator engages that he would be unable somehow to 'relate' to the
legislative process.""... Based on these limitations, the Speech or Debate
Clause has been held inapplicable to a wide variety of conduct that the
Courts have deemed insufficiently related to the legislative process, ranging
from accepting bribes to speech outside of the legislative process." 6
The Court's rulings on specific activities suggest that the Speech or
Debate Clause would not generally cover the types of disclosures of
information contemplated by the STOCK Act or other similar legislation.
Court precedents have held the Speech or Debate Clause inapplicable to the
release of certain types of information. For example, the Court has denied
immunity for information published in press releases."7 Even more closely
related to the provisions of trading regulation, the Court has held that
private publication of classified documents is not protected speech or
debate." ' In Gravel v. United States, the Court considered whether Senator
Mike Gravel was protected by the Speech or Debate Clause when he
arranged with a publisher to release the Pentagon Papers." 9  The Court
noted that "the heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either House,"'2 °
and that publishing the papers "was in no way essential to the deliberations
111. Id. at 179; see also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) ("The..
Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech.
without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch.").
112. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 606, 624 (1972) (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
at 168, 204 (1972)).
113. Id. at 624-25.
114. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172.
115. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972).
116. Id. at 526.
117. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979).
118. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 622.
119. Id. at 608-09.
120. Id. at 625.
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of the Senate."'' If conveying the information to third parties is not crucial
to the deliberative process, personal use of the information would be even
less related to the legislative process. Therefore, it seems unlikely the
Speech or Debate Clause would conflict with attempts to formally regulate
Congressional insider trading.
2. Internal Ethics Committees
Members of Congress are subject to internal investigations and
sanctions even if they are not subject to existing insider trading laws. Both
the House and Senate have ethics committees that have the authority to
punish their colleagues. 122 If these internal standards prohibit insider trading
by legislators, there may be no need to create further legislation to prohibit
the activity. This section discusses current Congressional regulations that
may ban trading on Congressional information by representatives, but
suggests that the current regulations are vague and that enforcement of
ethics regulations is infrequent.
3. Ethics Regulations in the House of Representatives and United
States Senate
The Code of Ethics for Government Service contains a passage that
may cover the use of confidential information for securities trading. The
Code cautions that "[a]ny person in Government service should ... [n]ever
use any information coming to him confidentially in the performance of
governmental duties as a means for making private profit." '23 This language
seems to apply directly to the issue of using confidential information for
securities trading, and at least one Congressman's office has suggested that
this provision currently bans insider trading by congressional
representatives." 4  The House Ethics Manual further states that this
provision is designed to eliminate conflicts of interest that arise from "a
situation in which an official's conduct of his office conflicts with his
private economic affairs." '125 This same regulation applies to the Senate as
121. Id.
122. The House committee is called the Committee on Standards and Official
Conduct, http://ethics.house.gov. The Senate committee is called the Senate Select
Committee on Ethics, http://ethics.senate.gov. See also Enforcement of Ethical Standards in
Congress, http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/jcoc 2 ac.htm (surveying internal ethics
committees).
123. Code of Ethics for Government Service, H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong. (1958),
reprinted in 2008 HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL.
124. Kudlow & Kramer (CNBC television broadcast Mar. 29, 2006) (reporting
conversation with counsel to Representative David Dreier).
125. HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 187 (2008).
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well, as the Senate concurred in the House Resolution establishing the
guidelines.'26
4. Potential Problems with Ethics Committee Enforcement
Although insider trading based on information that congressional
representatives obtain from Congress may be prohibited by internal ethics
regulations, the ethics committees prosecute legislators only infrequently.
As a result, the threat of sanctions imposed by the ethics committee may not
deter use of confidential information for securities trading in the same way
the increased SEC enforcement contemplated by legislation like the STOCK
Act would.
Congressional documents show that House and Senate ethics
committees rarely prosecute fellow legislators. In 1993, Congress published
a report on the House and Senate Ethics Committees.'27 The report
determined that "Actual disciplinary actions by the full Senate or House
have, in fact, been relatively rare."'28 The Senate has censured only nine
Senators in its history, and the House only twenty-two Representatives. 2 9
The web page for the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
lists only five reports dating back to the 105th Congress. 3 '
Several commentators in the media have noted ethics committee
inaction in response to well-known Congressional scandals. One journalist
remarked that although "Over the last two years, three Republican
congressmen and two Democrats have been enveloped by ethical scandals.
[t]hrough all of this muck and scandal, the Ethics Committee has
accomplished nothing."'' News reports suggest the prior year was no
different. The Washington Post wrote that "[t]he House ethics committee,
the panel responsible for upholding the chamber's ethics code, has been
virtually moribund for the past year, handling only routine business despite
a wave of federal investigations into close and potentially illegal
relationships between lawmakers and lobbyists. '32
126. Code of Ethics for Government Service, H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong. (1958),
reprinted in 2008 HOUSE ETHics MANUAL.
127. Enforcement of Ethical Standards in Congress, supra note 121.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. U.S. Committee on Standards of Official Conduct,
http://ethics.house.gov/lnvestigations/Default.aspx.
131. Michael Scherer. Paging the Ethics Committee. SALON.COM, Oct. 6, 2006,
available at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/10/06/ethics/print.htmi (last visited
April 15, 2009).
132. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, In a Season of Scandals, Ethics Panels are on the
Sidelines, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2005, at A02. The article specifically references inaction
over the Randall "Duke" Cunningham bribery scandal.
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The apparent ineffectiveness of the ethics committees may derive from
several characteristics of the committees. Members of internal ethics
committees must continue to work with legislators they might sanction,
providing an incentive not to investigate."' Furthermore, committee
members will be reluctant to investigate activities in which they themselves
might be participants.'34 Senator Barack Obama of Illinois criticized these
elements of the ethics committees by stating: "There's some good reason for
the American people to be skeptical of our enforcement system. After all,
we in the Senate are our own judge, jury, and prosecutor." '135 When
legislators are forced to judge their peers, they may forgo prosecution to
preserve working relationships and to avoid setting precedents that may
later be used against them.
For these reasons, the internal ethics committees are likely insufficient
to obviate the need for legislation. Internal regulations, while vague, seem
to proscribe using confidential information for private gain, and internal
ethics committees have the authority to punish legislators. However, the
structure and track record of ethics committees suggests that they would not
vigorously prosecute such activity. The third-party SEC, with powers
granted by the legislation like the STOCK Act, would be more likely to
investigate and prosecute insider trading by members of Congress.
5. Informal Ethical Norms
Finally, even if existing regulations are weak or nonexistent, informal
ethical norms could theoretically prevent legislators from trading on
nonpublic information. We suspect that legislators may feel that trading on
information obtained through their positions is inappropriate, even if they
do not believe it is illegal. To investigate this issue, we contacted the
offices of many Senators and Representatives to ask about their
confidentiality policies and their thoughts about trading on Congressional
information. We ultimately communicated with two aides and one
Representative who offered their opinions about the issue.
We first received an e-mail from a former legislative assistant
describing both formal and informal constraints on legislators and their
staff. The assistant emphasized that within a legislative office, "loyalty is to
your boss, to his constituents, and to varying degrees, the party."' 36 This
suggests that people's actions are limited by informal constraints, but not in
the same way as a traditional insider trading case, where there is a fiduciary
133. The Creation of an Independent Ethics Commission, supra note 106 at 136.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. E-mail from a former legislative assistant, to Daniel J.L. Cohen (Mar. 25, 2008,
06:49:00 EST) (on file with authors).
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duty to the source of the information. Regarding the likelihood of a
legislator or staff member using information for private gain, the assistant
noted: "It's an honor system-you're not there for personal gain, you're
there to serve the people of district X. BUT, it's politics. People will play
their hands when they can. Sometimes to benefit their boss, sometimes to
benefit themselves.' '1 3
7
We discussed the same issues with the current chief of staff to a New
York Representative. He also emphasized that legislators perceive duties to
their constituents, and noted that these duties might compel disclosure of
information the Representative deems crucial to the residents of his
district. 138 Such a duty to represent constituents, if it exists, is not obviously
violated by a congressional representative's insider trading. Nevertheless,
the chief of staff emphatically suggested that the use of information for
trading securities was inappropriate. He noted: "Trading on any kind of
information to enrich oneself is, in this job, absolutely verboten."' 139
Lastly, Representative John F. Tierney of Massachusetts contacted us
by e-mail with his views on using Congressional information for trading.
He wrote that he and his staff members do not trade on private
Congressional information and that they are governed by a confidentiality
agreement.4 " Contrary to the New York Representative's chief of staffs
statements that most offices do not have a formal confidentiality agreement
because constituent concerns may demand disclosure, Congressman Tierney
wrote that: "[l]ike most Congressional offices and organizations, my office
has a confidentiality agreement, in which no disclosure of confidential
information is made to anyone except as required in the performance of
work. No use of confidential information shall be made in my office for
personal gain, advantage, or for harm of others. '1 4'
These discussions with legislative staff members suggest that, to the
extent the opinions are representative of congressional representatives as a
whole, legislators likely believe that using nonpublic information to benefit
themselves through securities trading is wrong. However, disclosing such
information is not always impermissible, especially when the information is
critical to the interest of their constituents.
137. Id.
138. Telephone interview with Paul Lipson, Chief of Staff to Rep. Jose E. Serrano
(Apr. 8, 2008).
139. Id.
140. E-mail from John F. Tierney, Congressman from Massachusetts. (May 5, 2008,
3:54 PM EDT).
141. Id.
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IV. TOWARD A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE
To this point, we have focused our discussion on several positive
issues related to regulation: the impetus for regulation, the provisions of the
STOCK Act, and whether current regulations make regulation unnecessary.
Now, we turn our attention to the normative side of the story. Congressional
"insider" trading may not be currently prohibited, but should it be? Should
congressional representatives be given the opportunity to earn abnormally
high returns142 by virtue of their service as elected officials? No citation is
needed to assert that this result strikes many people as unfair. We proceed
from the presumption that Congressional trading on material non-public
information should be prohibited, and we seek to determine if any
arguments can be made to justify the continued allowance of such trading.
As we have already discussed, Congressional trading is not insider
trading in the traditional sense of the term. Still, a good place to begin
looking for arguments in favor of Congressional insider trading is the
extensive academic literature on the anti-regulation side of the traditional
insider trading debate. After developing each of the arguments put forth
against a prohibition on traditional insider trading, we will consider any
significant counterarguments. We will not, however, enter the fray of the
insider trading debate by passing judgment on the merits of each argument
with respect to traditional insider trading. Instead, we will ask the following
question: assuming these arguments have merit as defenses of traditional
insider trading, do any of them apply to Congressional trading? If so,
perhaps the presumption against the continued allowance of Congressional
trading can be overcome.
There are at least six distinct arguments put forth in favor of
traditional insider trading that are worth considering. First, insider trading
can be a useful component of employee compensation. Second, insider
trading does not significantly harm long-term investors. Third, insider
trading promotes efficient pricing in capital markets. Fourth, insider trading
provides a more effective mechanism than traditional whistle blowing for
exposing corporate fraud and malfeasance. Fifth, insider trading on
negative information provides needed incentives for full disclosure of
corporate problems. Finally, sixth, managers can use observations of
insider trading by employees as signals for otherwise unobservable changes
in their companies. Each of these arguments will be discussed in turn, first
in terms of generic insider trading and then as they might apply to
Congressional trading.
142. See Ziobrowski et al., supra note 27.
Spring]
Journal of Business & Securities Law
A. Insider Trading as Compensation
Like each of the first three arguments listed above, the argument for
insider trading as compensation has its origin in Henry Manne's classic
book Insider Trading and the Stock Market.143 The heart of this first
argument is that the allowance of insider trading as a component of
employee compensation-just like the use of stock options as a component
of compensation--enables the insider to benefit from productivity increases
he causes the firm to experience."4  Thus, replacing other forms of
compensation with the allowance of insider trading incentivizes employees
to engage in productivity-increasing behavior.'45 In fact, as Manne has
pointed out, allowing employees to conduct insider trading is in many ways
a better form of incentive-generating compensation than using stock
options.'46 Insider trading does not produce situations where employees are
left with worthless out-of-the-money stock options that were supposed to
account for a significant percentage of their compensation; insider trading
does not prevent employees from earning compensation when their behavior
serves only to reduce an expected loss rather than to create a gain; insider
trading does not allow employees to profit when their company's stock
appreciates only in line with the market or industry; and insider trading does
not result in disgruntled employees pushing for renegotiation every time
their company's stock price declines significantly.'47 Stock options, on the
other hand, suffer from all of these pitfalls.
Of course, as Manne has acknowledged'48 since the publication of his
classic, the argument for insider trading as an efficient form of employee
compensation is not without its faults. There is no guarantee that the people
who first get the opportunity to invest on the basis of inside information will
always be the same people responsible for the productivity increases that
make the information valuable.'49 This problem is particularly apparent
once one considers that the determining factor in who gets the first
legitimate opportunity to invest on the basis of inside information might not
be who is privy to the information first. Rather, the determining factor
might be who possesses the wealth needed to capitalize on the information,
who has the analytical ability to understand the implications of the
information for the future of the stock price, or any of a number of other
143. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
144. Id. at 166.
145. Id. at 166.
146. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that
Did Not Bark, 31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 167, 172-73 (2005).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 170-71.
149. Id. at 173.
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possibilities. 15 Moreover, and perhaps most obviously, the argument for
insider trading as a useful form of compensation seems to overlook the fact
that insiders may benefit just as easily from selling stock in the face of
declining productivity as from buying stock when productivity is on the
rise.'5' In fact, since it is arguably easier for most employees to generate
decreases in productivity than increases in productivity, 152 the incentives
created by insider trading as a form of compensation in fact seem quite
perverse. It is possible that reputational consequences and other concerns
about intentionally decreasing productivity outweigh the gains to be made
via insider trading, 153 but this is an open empirical question.'54
In addition to the various counterarguments levied against Manne's
idea of insider trading as compensation, significant limitations to his
argument have also been identified. For instance, Jonathan Macey and
David Haddock have identified two factors that are crucially important in
evaluating the desirability of insider trading as a form of compensation: the
attitudes of insiders toward risk,"'5 and the identities of the most informed
non-insiders.'56 The value of the opportunity to conduct insider trading, as
opposed to the value of many other forms of employee compensation, is a
non-uniform random variable at the time the employment contract is
created. Thus, in accepting insider trading as a form of compensation,
employees are necessarily taking on some risk. Therefore, if employees are
risk-averse, tradeoffs between insider trading and other forms of
compensation with predetermined values in employment contracts will not
be one-to-one on an expected value basis."'7 Employees will want a greater
expected value increase from compensation via insider trading than they
will be willing to sacrifice in decreases in other forms of less risky
150. Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and
the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1455 (1967).
151. Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of
Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 149.
152. Kristoffel Grechenig, Positive and Negative Information - Insider Trading
Rethought 9 (Univ. of St. Gallen Law Sch. Law and Economics Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 2007-28), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019425 (last visited
April 15, 2009).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. David D. Haddock & Jonathan Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80
NW. U.L. REV. 1449,
1459-62 (1986).
156. Id. at 1458-59.
157. Id. at 1462.
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compensation. Insider trading, then, is likely a poor choice among forms of
compensation if employees are risk-averse." 8
Haddock and Macey's second observation is that the merits of insider
trading as a form of compensation depend on whether market professionals
or regular shareholders are the most informed non-insiders. In other words,
it matters whether market professionals possess information not available to
regular shareholders that would allow them to profit from trading with
regular shareholders if insiders were not allowed to trade first on the same
information. If market professionals possess such information, then
allowing insider trading as a form of compensation prevents market
professionals from profiting at the expense of regular shareholders." 9 On
the other hand, if market professionals have no such information - if regular
shareholders are the most-informed non-insiders - then market
professionals could not profit at the expense of regular shareholders even in
the absence of insider trading. The only possible result of allowing insider
trading as a form of compensation in this case would be the prevention of
shareholders from profiting on what could be seen as a corporate
opportunity, presumably a negative outcome. 6 '
Finally, it is unclear how a corporation could limit the compensation
employees could expect to earn from insider trading, making insider trading
practically difficult as a substitute for wage compensation. Whereas the
amount of employee options and stock purchase plans can be dictated by the
company, insiders' potential profit off trades seems limited only by the
amount of credit they can access and the amount of shares they can
purchase or sell before their information is incorporated into the stock price.
As was stated earlier, we do not intend to evaluate the merits of
Manne's argument in the context of generic insider trading.
Counterarguments and limitations are presented only to provide a better
understanding of each argument before attempting to apply the argument to
Congressional trading. In this case, it is fairly straightforward that--even
assuming Manne's argument has merits for generic insider trading-
Congressional trading cannot be justified by arguing that it is a useful form
of compensation for congressional representatives. Insider trading would be
a useful form of compensation for congressional representatives only if it
provided them with favorable incentives. While it is desirable to provide a
corporate employee with the incentive to partake in productivity-increasing
behavior, it is not desirable to provide congressional representatives with
the incentive to increase the value of one particular corporation as compared
158. This only fails to be true if those who bear the ultimate burden of paying
employee salaries (presumably the shareholders) are risk-loving, which is almost certainly
not the case.
159. Haddock & Macey, supra note 154, at 1458-59.
160. Id. at 1459-60.
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to others. In fact, as Stephen Bainbridge has explained, "Stock trading by
congressmen .. .presents a double-edged conflict of interests. They may
vote on the basis of their trading plans or trade on the basis of their voting
plans....' Compensating congressional representatives via insider trading
does not have the same potential benefits as compensating regular insiders
in this manner. This first argument does not justify Congressional trading.
B. Lack of Harm to Long-term Investors
The second argument offered by Manne in Insider Trading and the
Stock Market is that insider trading does not actually harm long-term
investors.'62 It is helpful to approach this argument in two steps. First,
consider any investor whose decisions about whether to trade in a stock are
not affected by price movements that result from insider trading. Since
insider trading causes changes in stock prices that would eventually happen
anyway, such an investor who chooses to hold his position in a company
whose insiders are trading should not be affected. If this investor chooses to
change his position in the company and transact with the insiders, he would
have been transacting in the same manner if the insider trading were not
occurring. Thus, if he buys from an insider who is selling on negative
information, he will actually get to pay a lower price since the insider
trading is driving the stock price down. If he sells to an insider who is
buying on positive information, he will sell at a higher price because the
insider trading is pushing the stock price up. Our hypothesized investor
actually benefits from the insider trading whether he's buying or selling!
The second step of the argument is much simpler. "The long-term
investor," Manne argues, "is much less likely than the trader to sell because
of price changes effected by insiders." '63 In other words, long-term
investors are likely to very closely approximate our hypothesized investor
and thus are unlikely to be harmed by insider trading. To quote Manne
again, "no real damage is caused to a[] [long-term] investor who engages
anonymously on an exchange in a trade with an insider on the other side of
the transaction. ' 4
The primary counterargument that has been put forth against this
claim is that every participant in the stock market, long-term investors
included, pays an "insider trading tax" on each transaction. 65  Market
makers, the argument goes, systematically lose money when insiders
161. Stephen Bainbridge, Insiders on the Hill, TCS DAILY, Mar. 30, 2006, available
at http://tcsdaily.comarticle.aspx?id=033006D (last visited April 15, 2009).
162. Manne, supra note 145, at 93-103.
163. Manne, supra note 142, at 102.
164. Manne, supra note 145, at 168.
165. Id.
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trade,'66 so they will increase the bid-ask spread to cover this extra cost of
conducting business. 67 The burden of insider trading is thus passed along
from market makers to market participants generally, effectively creating a
tax on transactions throughout the market. Because market participants are
aware of this tax, they are inclined to purchase securities only at a lower
price and sell at a higher price, increasing the cost of equity and reducing
the profitability of new capital projects, perhaps even abandoning projects
that would otherwise have a positive net present discounted value. This
counterargument has been empirically challenged, 68 but it has not been
conclusively rejected.
Assuming that Manne is correct that insider trading does not harm
long-term investors, his argument should apply just as well to Congressional
trading as to regular insider trading. Unlike with the compensation
argument, the "no harm" argument has nothing to do with the identities of
the people conducting the informed trades. If Manne's argument has merit
for normal insider trading, it has merit for Congressional trading.
C. Pricing Efficiency of Markets
Manne's third argument against the prohibition of insider trading is
that insider trading improves the pricing efficiency of markets. In other
words, insider trading causes stock prices to reflect more accurately the true
values of companies than they otherwise would. Such pricing accuracy is
beneficial primarily because it results in a more efficient allocation of
capital among companies,169 but also because it decreases the volatility of
stock prices. 70 No significant theoretical counterargument has been made
against the claim that insider trading should lead to more efficient pricing; it
seems fairly straightforward that allowing insiders to trade on their
knowledge will cause stock prices to reflect information that would
otherwise not be reflected. The empirical evidence on this point, however,
has been cast in different lights by different scholars. Manne has recently
166. Since market makers stand ready to trade with all partners and the decisions of
some potential trading partners will be affected by price movements caused by insider
trading, the trading of market makes will be affected by price movements caused by insider
trading. Thus, market makers do not approximate our hypothesized investor and may (in
fact, likely will) be harmed by insider trading.
167. Manne, supra note 142, at 168.
168. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U.L. REV. 83 (2004).
169. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading: An Overview 778 (SSRN Working
Paper Series), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 132529 (last visited April 15, 2009).
170. Id. at 778-79. Bainbridge asserts that lower volatility is a positive because it
"decreases the likelihood of individual windfall gains and increases the attractiveness of
investing in securities for risk-averse investors."
[Vol. 9
Insider Trading in Congress
claimed that "the argument for a strong positive relationship between
market efficiency and insider trading has proved to be very robust."''
Stephen Bainbridge, on the other hand, asserts that the effects of insider
trading on stock prices occur "slowly and sporadically,' 72 and thus that "the
market efficiency justification for insider trading loses much of its force." '173
Assuming that Manne's pricing efficiency argument is valid as applied
to regular insider trading, it should also be valid as applied to Congressional
trading. The pricing efficiency argument, like the "no harm" argument, has
nothing to do with who conducts the informed trading. However, since
opportunities for Congressional trading may be less common than
opportunities for normal insider trading, one would think that Congressional
trading would have a less significant-perhaps even statistically
insignificant--effect on the pricing efficiency of American capital markets.
The limited available empirical evidence seems to support the view
that Congressional trading does not have a significant effect on pricing
efficiency. As can be seen in Figure 1, infra page 9, there is no marked
increase in cumulative abnormal returns immediately following a purchase
of the stock by Senators. Proponents of the pricing efficiency argument
would argue that Senators are incentivized to credibly disseminate their
inside information to the market, so that the stocks they have just purchased
increase in price, resulting in profit. If such dissemination occurred,
Senators' cumulative abnormal returns should increase rapidly in the days
immediately following a purchase. However, abnormal returns do not start
increasing until twenty-five days after purchase, and begin to increase
significantly only 65 days after purchase, suggesting that Senators are not
significantly distributing their inside information, and thus that market
efficiency is improved little by Congressional insider trading, if at all.
Even though Figure 1 includes all Senator purchases, and therefore a
significant number of non-insider trades, we would still expect a rapid
increase of cumulative abnormal returns in the days immediately following
a purchase if Senators were circulating their information (assuming Senators
were engaging in insider trading, which as already discussed is suggested by
their high returns). This increase should occur because non-insider
purchases, when averaged, should result in a horizontally-flat cumulative
abnormal returns line-or perhaps a gradually-increasing line if Senators
choose savvy investment brokers-and the inside purchases should have a
sharp increase in cumulative abnormal returns immediately following the
purchase. The average of the two types of purchases should still feature a
marked increase.
171. Manne, supra note 142, at 169.
172. Bainbridge, supra note 168, at 780.
173. Id.
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D. Insider Trading as Whistleblowing
The fourth argument against prohibiting insider trading, and the first
not developed originally by Henry Manne, is Jonathan Macey's argument
that insider trading may provide a more effective mechanism for exposing
corporate fraud and malfeasance than traditional whistleblowing.'74
Professor Macey takes the position that whistleblowing and insider trading
on "whistleblower information"-information about corporate corruption,
fraud, or other malfeasance-should be regulated similarly. 75 Both should
be actively encouraged when the whistleblower or insider has a rightful
property interest in the underlying information, and both should be illegal
when no such rightful property interest is present.7 6
Macey claims that whistleblowing and insider trading on
whistleblower information are "analytically and functionally
indistinguishable,"' 77 but he goes on to point out some pragmatic rationales
for the superiority of insider trading. First, Macey argues that insider
trading provides more credible evidence of fraud or corruption than does
whistleblowing. 8"'[T]he talk involved in whistleblowing is cheap," Macey
argues, "while the trading involved in short selling is costly to the short
seller whose information about the underlying company is erroneous."' 79
Essentially, since insider traders have to put their money where their mouths
are, allegations of fraud and corruption brought to light via insider trading
are more likely to be legitimate than similar allegations made by a
whistleblower, who risks no finances. Second, Macey notes that
whistleblowing relies on government officials "who are often poorly
motivated or inept,"' 180 while insider trading does not suffer from this pitfall.
For these reasons, among others, Macey claims that insider trading is often
preferable to whistleblowing as a mechanism for exposing corporate
wrongdoing.
Even if Macey is right that insider trading on whistleblower
information is often a better alternative than whistleblowing, his argument
does not really apply to Congressional trading. This point is definitional,
and not all that interesting. A whistleblower, per Professor Macey, is "an
employee or other person in a contractual relationship with a company who
reports misconduct to outside firms or institutions, which in turn have the
174. Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899 (2004).
175. Id. at 1902.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1912.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1915.
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authority to impose sanctions or take other corrective action against the
wrongdoers.""' Thus, there are no whistleblowers in Congress, so arguing
that Congressional trading is a better alternative to whistleblowing for
exposing material non-public information about corporate wrongdoing
known by congressmen is a vacuous argument. This is not to say, however,
that Congressional trading on negative information (including information
about corporate wrongdoing) has no value as a mechanism for bringing such
information to light. In fact, this is the next argument we consider.
E. Incentive to Disclose Negative Information
Kristoffel Grechenig has argued that insiders need incentives to
disclose negative information in general, whether about corporate
malfeasance or just poor earnings." 2 Insiders have strong incentives not to
disclose such negative information, as such disclosures could result in less
pay (particularly via the reduced value of stock options), less marketability
when switching jobs, social sanctions, and other repercussions. "' While
disclosure duties may seem like a solution to this problem, Grechenig
contends that allowing insiders to trade on negative information is a better
solution in some cases because it entails no enforcement costs."' He does
acknowledge that insider trading on negative information is not costless, as
it may cause insiders as a whole to overinvest in the search for negative
information. 8 ' Grechenig concludes that insider trading on negative
information should not replace disclosure duties, but rather should serve as
a supplement to them.'86
Grechenig acknowledges that his argument is potentially susceptible
to one of the critiques of Henry Manne's "insider trading as compensation"
argument described earlier. 87 "If insiders were allowed to trade on bad
news," Grechenig explains, "they would have incentives to produce this
information in the first place. Clearly, producing negative information, and
then trading on it, is fairly easy .... Incentives for a deliberate production of
negative information results [sic] in inefficiencies."' 88 Having stated this
critique, Grechenig counters by listing the possible repercussions for an
insider who intentionally creates negative information, from lost
performance-based compensation to reputational harm and so on.'89 His
181. Id. at 1903.
182. Grechenig, supra note 151.
183. Id. at4.
184. Id. at 5.
185. Id. at6.
186. Id. at6.
187. See Grechenig, supra Part IV.A.
188. Grechenig, supra note 151, at 9.
189. Id.
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intuition is that the repercussions outweigh the benefits, but he admits that it
is an empirical question. 9° If his intuition proves wrong, Grechenig
suggests that a rule allowing all insiders but the producer of the negative
information to trade on it might be a good solution.19' Such a rule would
also solve the potential problem of insiders increasing risk in excess of
investor preferences in order to increase their profits via trading in both
directions,192 yet it might be practically impossible.
Grechenig's argument applies naturally in the context of
Congressional trading. Like typical insiders, congressional representatives
also have potentially strong incentives not to seek out and disclose negative
information they learn about corporations. As elected officials, they might
not want to be the bearers of bad news. Moreover, earning a reputation for
reporting negative corporate information to the public might be costly to
congressional representatives in terms of corporate support and contacts.
congressional representatives are at risk of falling prey to overinvestment in
the search for negative information, but such a possibility seems somewhat
far-fetched in light of the wave of corporate corruption that Congress
allowed to occur for most of the past decade.
Nevertheless, congressional representatives likely have more incentive
to publicize negative information than corporate insiders do. They are not
employed by the company to which the information pertains, and therefore
do not risk losing their job and human capital if the company performs
poorly. Furthermore, a congressional representative with his constituents'
best interests in mind may also have incentive to reveal negative
information early. Constituents will be better off if they can adjust their
lifestyles and security holdings early, rather than waiting until the
information is revealed only once the company enters bankruptcy as a result
of desperate attempts to counteract whatever is causing the negative
information. Thus, it is unclear whether congressional representatives need
the extra incentive of insider trading to disclose negative information. The
disadvantages to allowing their insider trading may outweigh any positive in
increased disclosure that might result.
F. Insider Trading as a Signaling Mechanism
While the first three arguments we discussed were originally
developed by Manne in 1966, Manne put forth this final argument only in
2005.19' One of the key advantages of regular insider trading, Manne
suggests, is that it causes changes in stock prices that managers can use as
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Manne, supra note 142, at 182-83.
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signals for problems in their companies that they otherwise might fail to
observe. 94 For instance, imagine a scenario in which a division head of a
company knows that a highly anticipated product within his division is not
developing as had been hoped. The division head may not want to tell
upper management this negative information, fearful that he will be
replaced or otherwise disciplined. If the division head is not allowed to
engage in insider trading, upper management will not learn about the
negative information in a timely manner. On the other hand, if the division
head is allowed to conduct insider trading based on the information, upper
management will see the stock price falling due to the division head's
selling of shares. Upper management will at least know that something is
wrong, though they will still have to figure out the actual cause of the
falling stock price. Manne acknowledges that this may sometimes be
difficult, and he also acknowledges that upper management might even be
hard-pressed to notice the decrease in stock price since other factors are
simultaneously affecting the price.'95 In spite of these limitations, Manne
argues that it is still better for managers to be given a chance to discover
problems in a timely manner by watching stock price changes than for no
such opportunity to exist at all.'96
Manne's argument that normal insider trading provides helpful signals
of corporate problems to managers is not applicable to the Congressional
context. First, it is unlikely that congressional representatives would often
know aspects of the inner workings of companies that the companies'
managers would not already know. Second, while it is possible that a
congressional representative would learn something through his work that
would be useful information for a corporate manager, congressional
representatives would not be disinclined to tell the corporate manager in the
same way that the division head in the above hypothetical would be. If the
information were not protected by a confidentiality duty, the congressional
representative could simply talk to the corporate manager. Manne's
manager signaling argument thus seems to provide very little, if any,
justification for Congressional trading.
G. Summary of Six Traditional Arguments Against Restricting Insider
Trading
Three of the arguments against the prohibition of traditional insider
trading are applicable to the Congressional trading context, while three are
not. Allowing Congressional trading will not significantly harm long-term
investors; it may promote efficient pricing in capital markets; and it may
194. Id.
195. Id. at 183.
196. Id.
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give congressional representatives needed incentives to disclose negative
information about corporations. On the other hand, Congressional trading is
not a useful form of compensation; it is not an alternative to
whistleblowing; and it will likely not produce stock price changes that can
serve as useful signals to corporate management.
The three arguments applicable to the Congressional trading context
highlighted above, although the most important, are not necessarily an
exhaustive list of all possible justifications for Congressional trading. Other
arguments in favor of Congressional trading may exist besides the ones that
have been made for traditional insider trading.
H. An Additional Argument Against Restriction: Democratic Accountability
One possible additional argument in favor of allowing Congressional
trading is that regulation is unnecessary because congressional
representatives are democratically accountable to the public for their
behavior. Congressional representatives have to publicly disclose their
trading activity, 97 so perhaps people will pay attention to these disclosures
and vote overly-opportunistic congressmen out of office. If this is the case,
Congressional insider trading will be effectively punished without any need
for intervening regulation. Definitive evidence of this possibility is not
present, but the fact that Senators with less seniority earn higher returns than
Senators with more seniority'98 could be seen as indirect evidence of
accountability for insider trading. The interpretative story is that voters,
aware of the perpetrators of opportunism, are not re-electing Senators who
earn abnormally high returns. Thus, only Senators who do not make insider
trades, and who thus earn more normal returns, are re-elected and become
more senior. Of course, it could also be the case that newer Senators have
greater incentives to earn abnormal returns, or that they are more likely to
still retain corporate contacts from their not-so-far removed days in the
private sector. Perhaps new Senators are simply younger and engage in
more risky investments, with correspondingly higher returns, than older and
more financially-conservative senators. However, given voter indifference
and the costs associated with individually analyzing and monitoring
congressional representatives' financial disclosures, it seems fairly unlikely
that voters are systematically voting out of office those Senators who earn
particularly high returns. While the evidence is inconclusive, democratic
accountability probably does not hurt the case for regulation of
Congressional trading. On the other hand, it probably does not provide a
strong deterrent.
197. See Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
198. Ziobrowski et al., supra note 27, at 674.
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V. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND MODIFICATIONS
In our experience, when presented with an explanation of the current
legality of Congressional insider trading, most people are mildly appalled-
or, in the case of a few securities analysts with whom we spoke, envious.
Based on these attitudes and a sense that public policy should reflect the
wishes of constituents, our initial presumption was against suggesting that
Congressional insider trading be allowed to continue. To overcome this
presumption, the traditional arguments for corporate insider trading would
have to strongly support Congressional insider trading. In reviewing these
arguments, though, this is not the case. Only half of the arguments usually
offered for corporate insider trading are even weakly applicable to
Congressional insider trading. The potentially significant costs associated
with the perverse incentives of Congressional insider trading seem, on
balance, to outweigh any benefits. Given that corporate insider trading is
illegal, and that it remains easier to justify than Congressional insider
trading, we cannot endorse Congressional insider trading.
Therefore, we suggest that Congressional insider trading should be
regulated. We assess the current attempt to regulate congressional
representatives' insider trading: the STOCK Act. If the STOCK Act were
to regulate Congressional insider trading, we suggest that it should be
modified in several important ways before being adopted. Broadly, the Act
should be changed to improve disclosure, as well as to equalize restrictions
applied to congressional representatives and federal employees, and to
Senate and House members.
Currently, Senators and House Representatives, and certain other
legislative employees, are required to file publicly-available financial
disclosures of securities transactions under section 101 of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978.'9' These reports must be filed annually and must
include a documenting of the dates and amounts of transactions greater than
$1,000, although the disclosed transaction amount need only fall within a
given range.2" The STOCK Act, as proposed, would increase the frequency
199. 92 Stat. 1824.
200. The current ranges for transactions are: not more than $15,000; greater than
$15,000 but not more than $50,000; greater than $50,000 but not more than $100,000;
greater than $100,000 but not more than $250,000; greater than $250,000 but not more than
$500,000; greater than $500,000 but not more than $1,000,000; greater than $1,000,000 but
not more than $5,000,000; greater than $5,000,000 but not more than $25,000,000; greater
than $25,000,000 but not more than $50,000,000; and greater than $50,000,000. See 5a
U.S.C. §102(d)(1). Id. This rule is also embodied in Title XXXIV of the Standing Rules of
the Senate, and Rule XXVI of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the 110th
Congress.
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of filing to within 90 days after a securities transaction. 21' After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, corporate insiders are now required to publicly
disclose their securities transactions within two business days.2  We see no
compelling reason for the STOCK Act's filing period to be so long, and
believe the Act would be more effective at disclosing insider trading and
increasing congressional accountability if the filing period is considerably
closer to the two-day period for corporate insiders.
The STOCK Act also places more restrictions on federal employee
insider trading than on Congressional insider trading. We believe the Act
should be equally restrictive towards both. The Act would prohibit federal
employees from trading securities based on material nonpublic information
relating to the issuer of the securities, 23 while the analogous section for
congressmen prohibits trading on inside information relating only to "any
pending or prospective legislative action relating to such issuer.... "204 It is
unclear why the Act would restrict Congressional trading on only pending
or prospective legislation relating to the stock issuer, rather than on any
inside information related to the issuer. One could imagine a situation such
as a briefing by the Department of Defense that alerts a congressional
representativeto an upcoming defense deal with a certain contractor, yet
because such information is not related to "pending or prospective
legislative action" concerning the contractor, the representative is not
restricted from trading the contractor's stock, whereas the federal employee
would be.2 °5 We feel the section for congressional representatives should be
changed to prohibit trading on inside information relating to the issuer of
the securities, like the restriction for federal employees.
Next, the STOCK Act amends the Rules of the House of
Representatives to prohibit disclosure of inside information related to
pending or prospective legislation for a public company if the
Representative believes the information will be used to buy or sell that
company's securities.2 6 This amendment is apparently aimed at stopping
the spread of insider trading, and would presumably prevent
Representatives from passing along information even when they derive no
201. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 682 § 4(a)(1), 111 th Cong.
(2009).
202. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (2008).
203. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 682 § 2(a), 1 1th Cong.
(2009).
204. Id.
205. Of course, insider trading could be prohibited in these situations by creating a
contractual duty not to disclose. Nevertheless, it is puzzling why federal employees and
congressional representatives would have different default rules against insider trading in
these contexts.
206. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 682 § 3, 111 th Cong.
(2009).
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direct or indirect benefit-behavior that is permitted following Chiarella.
Although it may be difficult to determine a situation in which
Representatives do not derive any benefit from passing information (after
all, they could always derive the benefit of building political capital or
increasing their awareness among constituents), it is unclear why we would
want a more restrictive rule for Representatives than for other potential
inside traders, or how to resolve the apparent conflict between this
amendment and the Supreme Court's holding in Chiarella.2 °
Additionally, just as with the different restrictions for congressional
representatives and federal employees discussed previously, it is unclear
why we would want to prevent Representatives from tipping information
relating to only prospective or ongoing legislation. If a goal of the Act is to
prevent the spread of insider trading, it would make more sense to restrict
tipping information relating to the broader category of any inside
information relating to the public company.
Furthermore, the Act includes no analogous provision for prohibiting
Senators from tipping inside information. Such behavior does not appear to
be already prohibited by the current Standing Rules of the Senate,2 8 and we
can think of no compelling reason to restrict Representatives, but not
Senators, from tipping inside information. Instead, we feel both
Representatives and Senators should be equally restricted from spreading
inside information relating to public companies.
With these suggested amendments, the insider-trading restrictions of
the STOCK Act is a strong piece of legislation worthy of endorsement.
There is credible evidence that Congressional insider trading has occurred
in the past, and that the current patchwork of laws and norms is inadequate
to stop its future practice. There is also a presumption, based on the feelings
of Americans and the obvious analogy to corporate insider trading, that
Congressional insider trading is inequitable and should be illegal. The best
arguments for corporate insider trading are not applicable enough to
Congressional insider trading to overcome this presumption. Thus, the
legality of Congressional insider trading constitutes an unfortunate gap in
securities law-one that should be filled by an amended version of the
STOCK Act, or some other similar regulation.
207. Having received direct or indirect benefit to be liable for tipping may not be the
most exacting requirement. For instance, the SEC found a tipper benefited by tipping his
adult film star girlfriend about upcoming mergers. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Court Enters Final Judgment Against James J. McDermott And Kathryn B. Gannon SEC
Bars McDermott from the Securities Industry (Jun. 7, 2005), available at
http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19250.htm (describing decision in an insider trading
case) (last visited April 15, 2009).
208. The current Standing Rules of the Senate are available at
http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/ (last visited April 15, 2009).
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